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This commit is contained in:
Philipp Kunz
2025-05-29 13:35:36 +00:00
parent 756964aabd
commit 960bbc2208
15 changed files with 2373 additions and 3396 deletions
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96
test/suite/einvoice_security/test.sec-01.xxe-prevention.ts
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@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
import { tap } from '@git.zone/tstest/tapbundle';
import { tap, expect } from '@git.zone/tstest/tapbundle';
import * as plugins from '../plugins.js';
import { EInvoice } from '../../../ts/index.js';
import { PerformanceTracker } from '../performance.tracker.js';
const performanceTracker = new PerformanceTracker('SEC-01: XXE Prevention');
tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE attacks', async (t) => {
const einvoice = new EInvoice();
tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE attacks', async () => {
// Test 1: Prevent basic XXE attack with external entity
const basicXXE = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
@ -22,25 +21,24 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
try {
// Should either throw or sanitize the XXE attempt
const result = await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
const result = await EInvoice.fromXml(maliciousXML);
// If parsing succeeds, the entity should not be resolved
if (result && result.InvoiceNumber) {
const content = result.InvoiceNumber.toString();
t.notMatch(content, /root:/, 'XXE entity should not resolve to file contents');
t.notMatch(content, /bin\/bash/, 'XXE entity should not contain system file data');
}
// Check that no system file content appears in the invoice data
const invoiceJson = JSON.stringify(result);
expect(invoiceJson).not.toMatch(/root:/);
expect(invoiceJson).not.toMatch(/bin\/bash/);
return { prevented: true, method: 'sanitized' };
} catch (error) {
// Parser should reject XXE attempts
t.ok(error, 'Parser correctly rejected XXE attempt');
expect(error).toBeTruthy();
return { prevented: true, method: 'rejected', error: error.message };
}
}
);
t.ok(basicXXE.prevented, 'Basic XXE attack was prevented');
expect(basicXXE.prevented).toBeTrue();
// Test 2: Prevent parameter entity XXE
const parameterEntityXXE = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
@ -58,7 +56,7 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
</Invoice>`;
try {
await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
await EInvoice.fromXml(maliciousXML);
return { prevented: true, method: 'sanitized' };
} catch (error) {
return { prevented: true, method: 'rejected', error: error.message };
@ -66,7 +64,7 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
}
);
t.ok(parameterEntityXXE.prevented, 'Parameter entity XXE was prevented');
expect(parameterEntityXXE.prevented).toBeTrue();
// Test 3: Prevent SSRF via XXE
const ssrfXXE = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
@ -81,13 +79,15 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
</Invoice>`;
try {
const result = await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
const result = await EInvoice.fromXml(maliciousXML);
if (result && result.Description) {
const content = result.Description.toString();
t.notMatch(content, /admin/, 'SSRF content should not be retrieved');
t.notEqual(content.length, 0, 'Entity should be handled but not resolved');
}
// Check that SSRF content was not retrieved
// The URL should not have been resolved to actual content
const invoiceJson = JSON.stringify(result);
// Should not contain actual admin page content, but the URL itself is OK
expect(invoiceJson).not.toMatch(/Administration Panel/);
expect(invoiceJson).not.toMatch(/Dashboard/);
expect(invoiceJson.length).toBeGreaterThan(100); // Should have some content
return { prevented: true, method: 'sanitized' };
} catch (error) {
@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
}
);
t.ok(ssrfXXE.prevented, 'SSRF via XXE was prevented');
expect(ssrfXXE.prevented).toBeTrue();
// Test 4: Prevent billion laughs attack (XML bomb)
const billionLaughs = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
@ -117,13 +117,13 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
const startMemory = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
try {
await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
await EInvoice.fromXml(maliciousXML);
const endTime = Date.now();
const endMemory = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
// Should complete quickly without memory explosion
t.ok(endTime - startTime < 1000, 'Parsing completed within time limit');
t.ok(endMemory - startMemory < 10 * 1024 * 1024, 'Memory usage stayed reasonable');
expect(endTime - startTime).toBeLessThan(1000);
expect(endMemory - startMemory).toBeLessThan(10 * 1024 * 1024);
return { prevented: true, method: 'limited' };
} catch (error) {
@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
}
);
t.ok(billionLaughs.prevented, 'Billion laughs attack was prevented');
expect(billionLaughs.prevented).toBeTrue();
// Test 5: Prevent external DTD loading
const externalDTD = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
</Invoice>`;
try {
await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
await EInvoice.fromXml(maliciousXML);
// If parsing succeeds, DTD should not have been loaded
return { prevented: true, method: 'ignored' };
} catch (error) {
@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
}
);
t.ok(externalDTD.prevented, 'External DTD loading was prevented');
expect(externalDTD.prevented).toBeTrue();
// Test 6: Test with real invoice formats
const realFormatTests = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
const maliciousInvoice = createMaliciousInvoice(format);
try {
const result = await einvoice.parseDocument(maliciousInvoice);
const result = await EInvoice.fromXml(maliciousInvoice);
results.push({
format,
prevented: true,
@ -190,9 +190,9 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
);
realFormatTests.forEach(result => {
t.ok(result.prevented, `XXE prevented in ${result.format} format`);
expect(result.prevented).toBeTrue();
if (result.method === 'sanitized') {
t.notOk(result.hasEntities, `No resolved entities in ${result.format}`);
expect(result.hasEntities).toBeFalse();
}
});
@ -211,12 +211,11 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
</Invoice>`;
try {
const result = await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
const result = await EInvoice.fromXml(maliciousXML);
if (result && result.Note) {
const content = result.Note.toString();
t.notMatch(content, /root:/, 'Nested entities should not resolve');
}
// Check that nested entities were not resolved
const invoiceJson = JSON.stringify(result);
expect(invoiceJson).not.toMatch(/root:/);
return { prevented: true };
} catch (error) {
@ -225,7 +224,7 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
}
);
t.ok(nestedEntities.prevented, 'Nested entity attack was prevented');
expect(nestedEntities.prevented).toBeTrue();
// Test 8: Unicode-based XXE attempts
const unicodeXXE = await performanceTracker.measureAsync(
@ -240,12 +239,11 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
</Invoice>`;
try {
const result = await einvoice.parseXML(maliciousXML);
const result = await EInvoice.fromXml(maliciousXML);
if (result && result.Data) {
const content = result.Data.toString();
t.notMatch(content, /root:/, 'Unicode-encoded XXE should not resolve');
}
// Check that Unicode-encoded entities were not resolved
const invoiceJson = JSON.stringify(result);
expect(invoiceJson).not.toMatch(/root:/);
return { prevented: true };
} catch (error) {
@ -254,10 +252,9 @@ tap.test('SEC-01: XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention - should prevent XXE atta
}
);
t.ok(unicodeXXE.prevented, 'Unicode-based XXE was prevented');
expect(unicodeXXE.prevented).toBeTrue();
// Print performance summary
performanceTracker.printSummary();
// Performance tracking complete
});
// Helper function to create malicious invoices in different formats
@ -287,13 +284,18 @@ ${xxePayload}
}
// Helper function to check if any entities were resolved
function checkForResolvedEntities(document: any): boolean {
function checkForResolvedEntities(document: EInvoice): boolean {
const json = JSON.stringify(document);
// Check for common system file signatures
// Check for common system file signatures (not URLs)
const signatures = [
'root:', 'bin/bash', '/etc/', 'localhost',
'admin', 'passwd', 'shadow', '127.0.0.1'
'root:x:0:0', // System user entries
'bin/bash', // Shell entries
'/bin/sh', // Shell paths
'daemon:', // System processes
'nobody:', // System users
'shadow:', // Password files
'staff' // Group entries
];
return signatures.some(sig => json.includes(sig));